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This article investigates collective bargaining trends in the German private sector since 2000. 
Using data from the IAB Establishment Panel and the German Establishment History Panel, it 
provides both cross sectional and longitudinal evidence on these developments. It confirms that 
the hemorrhaging of sectoral bargaining, first observed in the 1980s and 1990s, is ongoing. 
Furthermore, works councils are also in decline, so that the dual system also displays erosion. 
For their part, any increases in collective bargaining at firm-level have been minimal in recent 
years, while the behavior of newly-founded and closing establishments does not seem to lie at 
the root of a burgeoning collective bargaining free sector. Although there are few obvious signs 
of an organic reversal of the process, some revitalization of the bargaining system from above is 
implied by the labor policies of the new coalition government.  
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Introduction   
Collective bargaining coverage in Germany has been declining for some considerable 
time. Interestingly, one of the earliest and most influential analyses of this process of 
erosion was published in English by Hassel (1999). Hassel documented the falling 
proportion of employees covered by sectoral agreements and the weakening in works 
council coverage in the two decades of the last century. She also charted a tendency 
toward increasing decentralization within traditional collective bargaining, on top of that 
more obvious decentralization brought about by the growth of firm-level bargaining on 
the Anglo-Saxon pattern and, indeed, individual bargaining. For Hassel, both factors 
had systematically eroded the German system of industrial relations to the point where 
it threatened the regulative capacity and institutional resilience of the German model.
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Subsequent information on the falling share of sectoral agreements and 
declining membership density of employer associations and unions is generally 
supportive of continued institutional erosion (see, inter al, Hassel, 2002; Silvia and 
Schroeder, 2007; Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2007). But while debate over the 
changing face of German industrial relations and in particular the consequences of that 
altered state has certainly not abated – to the contrary it has both grown and sharpened – 
presentation of the facts of the case has been piecemeal and at important points has 
lagged the debate.  This has certainly complicated understanding of the German 
situation for foreign observers.
2
  
As a practical matter, data from the best source of information on the changing 
architecture of German industrial relations – the IAB Establishment Panel (see below) – 
has been published on an annual  basis since 2004 (with the exception of 2006) in the 
German-language series WSI-Mitteilungen (see, for example, Ellguth and Kohaut, 2011, 
2012, 2013). These annual updates are also summarized in such publications as 
European Industrial Relations Observatory On-line. But there is the question of 
accessibility of the former material to non-German observers and real issues as to 
breadth of coverage of summarized IAB statistics in the secondary sources. For both 
reasons, foreign observers may have found factual material on the structure of German 
industrial relations more fragmented than heretofore at a time of increasing controversy 
over the role of change.  
The goal of the present article is to chart within a unified framework changes in 
the architecture of German industrial relations since the turn of the century, using the 
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main, nationally representative dataset available to German researchers. We shall 
provide chapter and verse on the changing coverage of the dual system of industrial 
relations in Germany, both in terms of establishments and employees covered. That is, 
we will examine the course of sectoral bargaining (i.e. area-wide, industry agreements) 
and the health of the works council entity, both severally and jointly. We will also trace 
the development of firm-level agreements, and of course that of the collective 
bargaining free sector. Differences by broad region, employment size, and branch are 
also examined. In addition, we examine collective bargaining in establishments that are 
permanent stayers in the survey, noting differences between them and newly-born and 
failing establishments. Transitions between bargaining states are also examined over the 
period as a whole. And although our focus is at root descriptive, we shall also address 
whether one oft-cited factor behind the decline in collective bargaining – outsourcing – 
might be causally related to the decline in collective bargaining as a whole. Our focus 
therefore is upon the decline in the coverage of collective agreements, that is, upon a 
process of external erosion. At certain defined points, however, we shall also address 
empirically issues with a bearing on internal erosion of area-wide agreements as well.  
 
Institutional Background: Decentralization and Internal and External 
Erosion  
Industrial relations in Germany is a dual system with two distinct pillars of interest 
representation. One pillar consists of industry-wide regional (or sectoral) collective 
agreements (Flächentarifverträge) between trade unions and the respective employers’ 
associations, although there are also firm-level agreements (Firmentarifverträge) 
between unions and single employers (examples include Lufthansa and Volkswagen). 
The second pillar comprises works councils (Betriebsräte), legally-based bodies 
representative of all employees that operate at plant level. Works councils are endowed 
with far-reaching information, consultation, and codetermination rights, in addition to 
their role in implementing sectoral agreements and handling grievances. Formally, the 
first pillar sets wages and working conditions and is commonly described as distributive 
in function (i.e. bargaining over the division of the joint surplus). These industry-wide 
agreements are legally binding on all union members and members of the employer 
federations, but are generally extended to all employees of the parties to the agreement. 
German legislation formally prohibits establishment-level agreements between works 
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councils and management that bypass industry-wide contacts. That is, works councils 
cannot conclude plant agreements (Betriebsvereinbarungen) on issues covered by 
collective bargaining unless expressly authorized to do so by the relevant sectoral 
agreement. For this reason it is conventional to describe their function as integrative 
(focusing on issues related to the size of the pie rather than its distribution). That said, it 
has long been recognized (even before the contractual innovations discussed below) that 
the contents of works agreements negotiated between establishments and their work 
councils have in practice ranged much beyond the terms fixed by the law (e.g. Müller-
Jentsch, 1995: 60-61). Further, econometric research suggests that wages are higher 
under works councils (e.g. Addison, Teixeira, and Zwick, 2010; Gürtzgen, 2010). In 
short, the separation of distribution from production issues in the German system is 
inevitably partial. This is of course not to deny that the existence of a sectoral agreement 
may reduce the possibility of a works council engaging in rent seeking activities (see, 
for example, Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003), or for that matter that higher wages may be 
offset by higher productivity (termed “rent-generation” by Brändle, 2013). 
Although this is not the place for a primer on works councils, we might note that 
works councils are mandatory but not automatic in all establishments with at least five 
full-time employees. The decision to set up a works council resides exclusively with the 
employees. Once in place, the information, consultation, and participation or 
codetermination rights of the works council are increasing in establishment size. (Full 
details on the constitution and authority of the works council entity is contained in 
Addison, 2009.) Note, finally, that works councils are formally independent of unions. 
That said, unions have for some time played an important role in the election of works 
councillors – putting up lists of candidates in the nomination process – and most works 
councillors are in fact union members. It is therefore no accident that works councils 
have been described as pillars of union security. This dual system is near-universally 
credited with having reduced industrial conflict at establishment level and as having 
promoted trust and cooperation.  
The relatively centralized German system of wage bargaining is widely 
recognized as having displayed considerable stability until the end of the 1980s. This 
was largely achieved by virtue of the devolved labor powers of workplace 
codetermination (via works councils) that permitted accommodation to (creeping) 
decentralizing trends (Thelen, 1991). As a result, sectoral agreements continued to 
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dominate in Germany long after their demise in countries such as Britain (Addison, 
Bryson, Teixeira, and Pahnke, 2011).  
But the process of decentralization has accelerated since the early 1990s. 
Sectoral agreements that in the 1970s had sought to develop a qualitative bargaining 
policy (Qualitative Tarifpolitik) seeking to accommodate improvements in working life 
and worker protection against dislocations resulting from rationalization and 
technological change through a process of local workplace implementation shifted in 
the 1990s to embrace distinctly quantitative adjustments to be implemented at local 
level (see, in particular, Schnabel, Zagelmeyer, and Kohaut, 2006: 168). The latter 
process was led by developments in the metal-working industry, when the employers 
secured far-reaching flexibility in working time arrangements at firm level in return for 
a stepped reduction in normal weekly hours – from 40 to 37.4 hours in western 
Germany and to 39.3 hours in eastern Germany.
3  
These new local adjustments initially involved unions and employers reaching 
“opening clauses” (Öffnungsklauseln), empowering the local actors to negotiate on 
matters normally dealt with by framework or sectoral agreements. In other words, 
opening clauses are regulated under section 4 of the 1949 Collective Bargaining 
Agreement Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz) and so offer a legal way to fall below the 
standards set under each regional and industry wide collective contract. They are very 
heterogeneous, differing widely in content (see, for example, Heinbach and Schröpfer, 
2007). Such contractual opt-out agreements initially comprised “hardship clauses” 
(Härtefallklauseln) where the local actors could apply to the collective bargaining 
parties for relief from contractually-agreed terms to preserve their economic viability – 
these clauses were first introduced in eastern Germany in the aftermath of reunification 
but then applied in western Germany as well – and opt-out arrangements allowing for 
plant-level agreements that deviated from collective agreements but which had typically 
to be validated by the collective bargaining parties. There were also clauses providing 
exemptions to small production units, allowing for individual contracts that paid less 
than the relevant union scales. Opening clauses on working time were dominant until 
the late 1990s while opening clauses on compensation are most common today 
(Brändle, 2013).  
But the issue of company derogations (or deviations) from central agreements 
was already a grey area in which  collectively agreed standards were undercut in a way 
that lacked transparency – outside of hardship clauses that contained clear procedural 
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standards. This was partly because of the set of contractual innovations described in the 
next paragraph. Ambiguity led to the emergence of a system of common rules and 
procedures for contractual deviations, together with an attempt to gain much closer 
control of these processes by the leadership of unions. The most important agreement 
here was the so-called Pforzheim Accord reached in the metalworking industry in 2004.
4
 
Thereafter, wildcat derogations or informal decentralization were to become less of an 
issue, although as Haipeter (2011a, 2011b) notes the task of exercising control over 
derogations in metalworking fell to the union rather than the employer after some major 
setbacks.  
Opening clauses were an attempt by the parties to deflect pressures to 
decentralize collective bargaining by allowing for a modicum of differentiation while 
generally avoiding delegating decision-making rights on wages to plant level. They 
were to be followed by so-called “pacts for employment and competitiveness” 
(betriebliche Bündnisse zur Beschäftigungs- und Wettbewerbssicherung). Although 
these successor agreements took their cue from opening clauses, they are often viewed 
as involving a more thorough-going form of decentralization by virtue of their 
concessionary bargaining nature.
5
 Company-level pacts are not regulated by any law 
directly. Initially designed to save jobs in the in circumstances of a plant crisis they 
have become increasingly common and are today a device to increase firm 
competitiveness used by both struggling and prosperous firm alike (Seifert and Massa-
Wirth, 2005; Ellguth and Kohaut, 2008).  
Around two decades experience with collectively agreed opening clauses has, 
then, changed the locus of collective bargaining in Germany. The shift in bargaining 
responsibilities to the company level has led to a material loss in regulatory power of 
the trade unions and employer associations. Collectively-agreed standards – once taken 
as fixed norms – have now become the objects of renegotiation at company level with 
varying degrees of involvement of the signatories to area-wide agreements. Unions have 
had to engage more directly with (the needs of) firms, while works councils have had to 
accommodate to management calls for local concessions rather than being able to rely 
on the mandatory character of sectoral regulations. Greater coordination has been 
required of unions to defend standards within individual sectors, at a time when the 
distinction between works councils and unions, once the hallmark of the dual system, 
has become blurred. These changes taken in conjunction with the fall in union 
membership (and that of employer associations) and the growth in the non-union sector 
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(Artus, 2008), increased wage dispersion (Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg, 2009), 
the emergence of a low wage sector (Bosch and Weinkopf, 2008; Holst, Nachtwey, and 
Dörre, 2010), and a decline in works council coverage (Kommission Mitbestimmung, 
1998) together constitute the crisis in German industrial relations.  
As discussed by Haipeter (2011a: 175), there are two principal interpretations of 
this crisis. The first is the erosion thesis first advanced by Hassel (1999), who viewed 
the process of decentralization as coming from below, initiated by management from 
the base and inevitably leading to a decline in non-market institutions. For Hassel, 
German wage bargaining institutions have been transformed towards a competitively-
driven model of wage regulation. Hassel (2014) emphasizes segmentation, namely the 
emergence of an export-oriented high skill industry on the one hand and a low-cost 
domestic services sector on the other, upon which the former depends to control labor 
costs. Although collaboration with labor – the hallmark of the old system – is still 
practiced, this cooperation and coordination applies only to an inner core of largely 
manufacturing firms that hire a “mix and match” of core employees and fringe 
employees [often subcontracted to cheaper service suppliers].”6 An increasingly dualist 
German economy has created an export-oriented high skill industry, depending upon a 
domestic environment of low cost services to control labor costs, sustained by wage 
subsidies for the unskilled, the lack of a minimum wage, and wage declines in the 
service sector – in addition to the contribution of offshoring proper.   
The other main industrial relations view is Streeck’s (2010) exhaustion thesis, 
namely a disorganized retreat of collective bargaining that is expected to generate a re-
institutionalization characterized by the replacement of statutory institutions with new 
institutions formed voluntarily by the market actors and typified by pacts. Since these 
pacts were from the outset consistent with deviations from the norms of collective 
bargaining they were part and parcel of the process of the internal erosion of collective 
bargaining norms. The new mode of coordination between capital and labor on this 
view is, then, one based on the exchange of job security for concessions on the part of 
labor.   
Haipeter (2011a, 2011b, 2013) offers a dissenting opinion, arguing that we are at 
once witnessing a process marked by both erosion and renewal, pending the resolution 
of which reports of the demise of the German model are premature. They are premature 
because they ignore the power of the system to react to the problems of erosion and 
disorganization at a time when the component institutions are still strong enough to self-
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repair. Haipeter describes how unions have sought to use the derogation process – 
where firms seek to undercut standards – as a starting point to build organizational 
power at the workplace through the greater involvement of the rank and file in the 
process of renegotiation. Haipeter also notes parallel innovation on the employer side, 
with the setting up of ‘unbound’ employer associations, offering members traditional 
services but without requiring them to follow collective agreements. So, the idea is that 
unions become stronger vis-à-vis local firms seeking derogations who are induced to 
make compromises in the form of quid pro quos. In this situation, the strike threat is 
said to have increased the attractiveness of the employer association entity that has 
meantime also built up its strength. The net result can be a reliance again on the benefits 
of industry wide standards – a renewal of the old social partnership at industry level. 
But this outcome is hardly guaranteed. While research indicates some positive results in 
favor of union revitalization, there is no suggestion that the revitalization strategy has 
been realized across the board (see also Silvia, 2013: 166-176). A further issue is the 
health of the works council institution since works council strength is a prerequisite of a 
proactive strategy. If works councils are in decline any such external erosion threatens 
revitalization and the reversal of internal erosion – organic revitalization as it were. 
Absent adequate employee representation at the workplace and company levels, 
decentralization of collective bargaining is likely to strengthen unilateral decision-
making by management. 
Before tracing the implications of the above contextualization for our own 
analysis, it is instructive to briefly address the work of economists in this area,
7
 not least 
since a much publicized recent article argues that that changes in collective bargaining 
have proven both central and transformative to economic performance. Dustmann, 
Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener (2014) attribute the dramatic changes in 
German employment and competitiveness to industrial relations developments, and in 
the process downplay the role of labor market and other reforms. For these authors the 
prime mover is the “inherent flexibility” of the German system of industrial relations. In 
particular, wage restraint and a dramatic decrease in real wages at the lower end of the 
wage distribution are attributed to the twin influences of the declining coverage of 
collective agreements on the one hand and contractual innovation on the other, 
specifically “the increase in opening clauses that strengthened the role of firm-based 
works councils in wage determination relative to trade unions” (Dustmann, 
Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener, 2014: 181). It is argued therefore that the 
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specific governance structure of the German system of industrial relations has allowed 
for an unprecedented increase in wage flexibility through decentralization. Empirical 
evidence in support of the proposition is based on an examination of the counterfactual 
changes in wages that would have occurred had collective bargaining coverage rates 
remained unchanged over the sample period examined (1995-2008) and on a description 
of (rising) wage inequality at the top and the bottom of the wage distribution in the 
covered sector. Interestingly, given their emphasis upon the system of industrial 
relations, the authors do not examine wage changes or wage distributions attendant 
upon a change in union status, nor do they directly examine the effects of opening 
clauses (or pacts) on wages or of the interplay between works councils and trade union.
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Indeed, economic studies of decentralization in its two main guises are 
decidedly sparse.
9
 However, some results pertinent to the analysis of Dustmann, 
Fitzenberger, Schönberg, and Spitz-Oener (2014) are as follows. First, there is the 
surprising finding that opening clauses do not seem to influence a firm’s decision to exit 
from a sectoral agreement (Ellguth and Kohaut, 2010). Second, as regards wages, higher 
wages induced by the presence of opening clauses (interpreted as a potential price for 
flexibility or insurance policy) seem to be followed by lower wages in the event of their 
application (Garloff and Guertzgen, 2012). But works councils seem to blunt both of 
these effects and they are independently associated with higher wages as well (Ellguth, 
Gerner, and Stegmaier, 2014), so that decentralizing bargaining structures cannot 
simply be equated with relinquishing bargaining power. That said, one recent study 
suggests that that flexibility provisions may not drive works council behavior toward 
rent seeking in circumstances where there is a sectoral agreement (Brändle, 2013).  
Third, there is no indication that opening clauses positively influence export activity 
(Heinbach and Schröpfer, 2008), or in their application foster employment growth 
(Brändle and Heinbach, 2013). Fourth, pacts have ambiguous consequences for training 
investments (Bellmann and Gerner, 2012a), the economic situation of the firm (Hübler, 
2006), investments in physical capital (Bellmann, Gerner, and Hübler, 2014), and with 
the exception of the most recent study for employment as well (Hübler, 2005a, 2005b; 
Bellmann, Gerlach and Meyer, 2008; Bellmann and Gerner, 2012b). Finally, there is 
little evidence that leaving a collective agreement has a dramatic effect on wages 
(Addison, Kölling, and Teixeira, 2014). In sum, the labor economics literature is 
something of a mixed bag in its evaluation of the decentralization process.  
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Taking this backdrop into account, it is clear that there are several facets to the 
erosion thesis. For its part, the issue of contractual innovation (opening clauses and 
pacts) has to do with the internal erosion of sectoral agreements. This question is best 
examined using information on actual agreements. (For detailed studies of the 
bargaining system and the process of internal erosion, see Massa-Wirth and Niechoj, 
2004; Doellgast and Greer, 2007; Haipeter and Lehndorff, 2009; and Bispinck and 
Schulten, 2010.) The main data set available to researchers does not permit 
identification of actual agreements and as we shall see the more general material it 
offers is available for a very short time period. Partly for this reason, internal erosion 
cannot be the preoccupation of the present inquiry. Rather, our focus will be upon the 
coverage of collective bargaining institutions and in particular the declining proportion 
of production units/employees whose wages are regulated by area-wide collective wage 
agreements. In addressing shrinking sectoral collective bargaining coverage, then, we 
are examining a process of external erosion of the area-wide collective agreement. This 
may of course be a function of bargaining level since a reduction in sectoral bargaining 
can arise from a growth in firm-level bargaining. Suffice it to say here, that the latter has 
been thoroughly dominated by a growth in bargaining between the firm and the worker 
– so-called individual bargaining – and both developments will be addressed (though 
not reverse feedback effects associated with any chilling effect of (flexible) sectoral 
agreements on firm-level bargaining).  Furthermore, the decline in bargaining has not 
been uniform and we will need to identify external erosion by region, firm size, and 
industry. So as to provide a more integrated perspective on collective bargaining 
developments, including the role of compositional factors, we have also to examine the 
different samples of permanent stayers, newly-formed establishments, and 
establishment deaths or exits.  
The health of the other tier of the German dual system of industrial relations, 
namely works councils, is no less central to the question of external erosion. Changes to 
the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) in 2001 sought to expedite and 
facilitate their formation so as to buttress the traditional system. However, since works 
councils are central to the regulative capacity of the German system, their health 
necessarily has implications for the process of internal erosion as well since any transfer 
of collective bargaining functions to the plant level from above is only formally viable 
where works councils are in place. If plant-level codetermination is the institutional 
‘buckle that binds’, it follows that any substantive reduction in work councils 
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contributes to internal erosion. Our focus on external erosion cannot then be exclusive 
after all. Nevertheless in commenting upon internal erosion our approach is necessarily 
indirect. Apart from examining the joint presence of sectoral bargaining and works 
councils, we shall investigate the association between works council presence and 
contractual innovations to see if this provides protean evidence of any revitalization of 
the dual system from below. And, since we are speaking of revitalization, for 
completeness we will also need to touch upon recent political developments that offer 
the prospect of revitalization from above.  
 
Coverage by Collective Agreement and Works Councils: Issues and 
Data 
The data sources used in this inquiry refer to establishments rather than to firms. The 
enabling survey of our principal dataset (see below) does indicate whether the 
establishment is a single-plant firm, but establishments belonging to multi-plant firms 
(i.e. all other cases) cannot be linked as component parts of the wider entity. Because 
we cannot speak of firms in these cases, the establishment is necessarily our unit of 
analysis. 
Our main indicator of collective bargaining and worker representation in works 
councils is based on an establishment panel rather than longitudinal information on 
individual workers. Collective bargaining/works council coverage is measured (a) by 
the share of all establishments with collective agreements/works councils, and (b) by the 
share of total employment accounted for by these entities. We then track these changes 
in coverage over time. First, we use twelve cross sections of data for the period 2000-
2011 to chart yearly coverage rates. We do so for all establishments, for those 
establishments that remain in the panel every year (termed ‘permanent stayers’), for 
those establishments that appear in one year but are absent in the previous year 
(‘births’), and for plants present in one year but absent in the next or some point 
thereafter (‘deaths’). Next, we exploit the longitudinal component to our data by 
examining annual transitions into and out of distinct collective bargaining/worker 
representation regimes – as well as the coverage rates for establishments that did not 
change their bargaining or worker representation status.  
 We disaggregate the data described below by broad region since major 
differences in sectoral and plant bargaining characterize eastern and western Germany 
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from the outset of our sample period. As noted above, we will also disaggregate by 
establishment size and sector. Note, finally, that the start of our sample period is 
dictated in part by substantive changes in industrial classification introduced between 
1999 and 2000. We begin with the year 2000 in part to avoid having to deal (twice) with 
matching problems raised by such material changes in industry definition. 
Our principal dataset is the Institute for Employment Research or IAB (Institut 
für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung) Establishment Panel (Betriebspanel) of the 
Federal German Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). The IAB 
Establishment Panel survey is based on a stratified random sample from the population 
of all establishments with at least one employee covered by social insurance (for a 
detailed description of the dataset, see Fischer, Janik, Müller, and Schmucker, 2009). 
There are some 19 industries and 10 employment size classes in the 2011 survey. The 
Establishment Panel began in 1993 for the former West Germany and was extended in 
1996 to the former GDR. 
The data are collected in personal interviews with the owner or senior 
management of the establishment. The information collected focuses on employment-
related matters and since 1995 has included information on the collective bargaining 
status of the establishment (i.e. its coverage or otherwise by a sectoral or firm-level 
agreement) and its works council status since 1993 (effectively in every year since 
2000). These are our key institutional outcome indicators.  
Given that our focus is upon the institutions of collective bargaining, we will 
also adjust our coverage measure to consider a conflation of the works council and 
sectoral collective bargaining coverage. In this way, we will examine the conjecture that 
there is a growing regulation gap in Germany, as would be manifested in a joint decline 
of plant-level codetermination and industry-wide collective bargaining. Also, although 
we cannot exploit the limited information in the parent survey on opening clauses and 
pacts so as to investigate their effect on the identified trends, we will nonetheless 
examine for three cross sections of the data information on the incidence of works 
councils by type of contractual innovation. To repeat, our goal here will be to detect 
signs of any revitalization of the dual system.  
At the outset, the Establishment Panel was designed to provide a continuous 
analysis of the labor market in Germany and as a result it has an interesting longitudinal 
dimension, allowing us to follow a sizeable number of establishments in successive 
years over a substantial period of time. Over our sample period, 2000-2011, the share of 
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establishments that is observed in every single year – permanent stayers – approximates 
14 percent. The remaining 86 percent comprise panel rotations together with 
establishment births and deaths. Pure panel rotations ranged from 11.8 percent of 
establishments in 2009 to 17.0 percent of establishments in 2001, averaging 13.4 
percent over the twelve cross sections. 
The goal of separating out births and deaths is to determine whether the trends 
identified across broad cross sections of the data also obtain for newly-founded 
establishments and plant closings. It is in particular regard to establishment births (and 
deaths), however, that the IAB Establishment Panel requires supplementation. The 
survey inquires of the establishment respondent whether or not the plant was founded 
prior to or after the year 1990. Only those respondents answering that the plant was 
born in or after 1990 are then asked to provide the exact year of birth. As a result, 
exclusive reliance on panel data involves a non-negligible possibility of error in coding 
the year of birth. Specifically, we found that for approximately 8 percent of all 
establishments over the sample period it was not possible to establish with precision 
from the panel whether the plant was founded before or after 1990. In addition, some 6 
percent of those plants reporting that they were not born before 1990 failed to provide 
the same year of foundation in successive surveys. 
Alternatively, newly-founded and failed establishments can be identified using 
the German Establishment Register (or Betriebsdatei) which contains in any given year 
all German establishments that have paid social security contributions for at least one of 
their employees. The first and last year in which an establishment is observed in the 
German Establishment Register may be used to determine the year of birth and death of 
an establishments, respectively. Because of an identical unique establishment identifier, 
information on the year of birth and death of an establishment can ultimately be linked 
to the IAB Establishment Panel. Indeed, in the initial draft of this paper, we exploited 
this information on the first and last appearance of the establishment identifier to 
establish plant openings and closings. Unfortunately, this approach also has its 
limitations because of misclassification bias. For example, an ownership change can 
yield a change of the establishment identifier, so that a continuing establishment with a 
new identifier will be regarded as a newly-founded establishment. To overcome such 
measurement errors, Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2010) have recently used worker 
flows to determine newly born and failed establishments, based on German 
administrative data (namely, the German Establishment History Panel or Betriebs-
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Historik-Panel). The basic idea is that when clustered worker inflows fall below a 
certain percentage of all worker inflows (say 30 percent) in the first year of an 
establishment identifier then the establishment can be called a new establishment and, 
equivalently in the case of an exiting establishment, an establishment death where 
clustered outflows are less than 30 percent of employment in the year before an exit.  In 
this way, Hethey-Maier and Schmieder provide very credible information on entries and 
exits of establishments, inter al., between 1975 and 2004. So much so that, the Research 
Data Centre of the Institute for Employment Research now offers regularly updated 
versions of these data. Information on establishment births and deaths currently covers 
the intervals 1975 to 2010 in the case of births and 1975 to 2009 for deaths. (For a 
detailed description of this material, see Hethey-Maier and Seth, 2010.) And using the 
common establishment identifier, we are able to match this dataset to our sample of the 
IAB Establishment Panel. 
 The upshot of this procedure is that it enables us to determine in any given year 
(a) whether the establishment is in the panel for the first time; (b) whether it is a 
continuing or a newly-born entity; (c) whether it is present in the panel in any of the 
following years; and (d) whether a firm exit from the panel is due to pure rotation or 
death. Aggregating across categories, we can in turn compute in any given year the 
share of births, deaths, and permanent stayers, inter al. As we have indicated, any such 
exercise is impossible using the IAB Establishment Panel alone. And, to repeat, the goal 
is to determine whether the trends identified across broad cross sections of the data also 
obtain for newly-founded establishments and plant closings. 
Over the entire 2000-2011 period, the raw sample contains some 185,000 
observations. Exclusions comprise agriculture, the extractive industries, public 
corporations, and all establishments with fewer than 5 employees (since this is the 
employment threshold for works council formation). After these filters were applied, 
missing values on collective bargaining and works council status resulted in the loss of 
a further 11,741 observations. The final sample was approximately 105,000 
observations. All the empirical results reported below are cross-section weighted, using 
the inverse of the selection probability. Given the nature of the weighting process, it is 
generally the case that an establishment is allocated different weighting factors in any 
two subsequent waves. (For this reason the sample of permanent stayers though uniform 
throughout varies in size with the cross-section weights.) 
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Collective Bargaining and Works Councils: Coverage, Trends, and 
Transitions  
Cross-Sectional Data  
Evidence on the coverage of collective bargaining and worker representation by 
establishment and by employment is presented in Figure 1 for all types of firm and in 
Figures 2 through 4 for the distinct categories of permanent stayers, newly-founded 
firms, and firm deaths. We consider each in turn. (Full tabular material corresponding to 
the graphical information is provided in Appendix Tables A1 through A4.) 
All Types of Establishment. Beginning with coverage by establishment, we see that at 
the all-German level collective bargaining has declined (panel (a), Figure 1). But the 
decline is confined to sectoral bargaining. Specifically, establishment coverage of 
sectoral bargaining is down from 47.9 percent in 2000 to 32.9 percent in 2011, while 
there is no concurrent growth in firm-level collective bargaining (coverage actually falls 
modestly from 3.1 to 2.4 percent of establishments). The corollary is a marked growth 
in the proportion of uncovered establishments: plants without a collective agreement of 
any kind have grown from 49.0 percent to 64.6 percent of all establishments. 
Establishment coverage of works councils has slowly but assuredly dwindled as well 
(from 11.4 to 9.3 percent of all establishments). Thus, the downward trend in plant-level 
codetermination, first detected by Hassel (1999), has continued. These (annual) trends 
in coverage are statistically significant for all but firm-level bargaining on this measure. 
(Figure 1 near here) 
Reflecting the greater likelihood of collective bargaining in larger 
establishments throughout the period, when we turn to examine the coverage of 
collective bargaining and worker representation by employment (see panel (b) of Figure 
1), the fall in sectoral bargaining emerges as somewhat more muted (down from 59.1 
percent to 47.8 percent of all employees) and there is now stability in the share of firm-
level agreements (at 7.2 percent in both 2000 and 2011). Nevertheless, the growth in the 
share of workers without any collective bargaining is still pronounced (up from 33.7 
percent in 2000 to 45.0 percent in 2011). Furthermore, the decline in works council 
coverage is still nontrivial on this employment measure (down 5.2 percentage points, 
namely from 47.6 percent in 2000 to 42.4 percent in 2011). All trends in coverage on 
this measure are statistically significant other than where noted to the contrary in 
Appendix Table A1.   
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The tabular material in Table 1 provides a simple breakdown of changes in 
coverage by establishment size, distinguishing between large units (≥ 250 employees) 
and small units (< 250 employees) for the nation as a whole.  The material makes it 
clear that, although the decline in sectoral bargaining and the growth in no collective 
bargaining are characteristic of both types of establishments, the respective percentage 
point rates of decline/growth in the small plant sample are roughly double those of their 
larger counterparts and, accordingly, the proportional changes smaller for larger 
establishments throughout. Similarly, works council coverage has held up better in 
larger establishments. Finally, although firm-level agreements are considerably more 
common in larger than smaller establishments, in neither case are the trends significant 
at conventional levels. 
(Tables 1 through 3 near here) 
 The analysis can be also conducted by sector. To this end, we first compare 
manufacturing with services. We then consider a finer, 7- and 11-sector disaggregation 
– covering, respectively, the 2000-2008 and 2009-2011 intervals – attendant upon the 
industrial reclassification of 2009. These results are provided in Tables 2 and 3. From 
Table 2 it can be seen that sectoral bargaining is declining in both manufacturing and 
construction and in services by a 10 to 15 percentage point margin irrespective of the 
selected measure (establishment or employee coverage). The frequency of firm-level 
agreements is sparse throughout. Absence of collective bargaining is more characteristic 
of services than in manufacturing and construction, in the range 10 to 15 percentage 
points. For their part, works councils cover roughly the same proportion of 
establishments in both sectors although they account for a majority (minority) of 
employees in manufacturing and construction (services). Confirming the strong stability 
of these patterns over time, the trend line is statistically significant at the .05 level or 
better in 13 of the 16 time series shown in Table 2. 
 The 7-sector disaggregation in Table 3A reveals some interesting patterns as 
well. First of all, with the exception of one case (i.e. industrial services), the coverage of 
sectoral agreements is always decreasing irrespective of the selected measure. The 
opposite is the case for the collective bargaining free zone. Secondly, the presence of 
sectoral agreements is pervasive in banking and insurance and, to a somewhat lesser 
extent, in construction too. Interestingly, while works councils in banking and insurance 
are commonplace the entity covers a small fraction of workers and establishments in 
construction. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the lowest presence of sectoral agreements is 
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observed in industrial services, both with respect to establishments and employees 
covered. Firm-level agreements are again sparse throughout, albeit with a higher-than-
average presence in traffic and communications.  
 Finally, the 11-sector disaggregation is given in Table 3B. The data cover 
only the final three years of the study period and are not fully comparable with the 
previous 7-sector information. The material confirms the pattern earlier observed for 
manufacturing, construction, and banking and insurance. Comparisons across the other 
sectors are more difficult because of the greater disaggregation of services in Table 3, 
but the limited collective bargaining presence in two sectors – information and 
communications and education – is notable particularly with respect to establishment 
coverage at less than 10 percent. Note that the low coverage of education is hardly 
surprising since only establishments from the private sector are retained in our sample. 
Now there are some marked regional differences in the coverage and course of 
collective bargaining and worker representation across Germany. In the east, sectoral 
bargaining coverage by establishments is markedly lower than in the west but has 
declined less, although the downward trends in both cases are statistically significant 
(see Appendix Table A1). In the west, equal numbers of establishments had no 
collective bargaining as had sectoral agreements by 2003. If anything, firm-level 
bargaining is more entrenched in the east, although there is a statistically significant 
decline in coverage. Establishments without collective bargaining of any type more 
clearly dominate in the east. As of 2000, for example, 66.8 percent of establishments in 
eastern Germany compared with 44.7 percent in western Germany had no collective 
agreement. That said, the growth of this bargaining-free sector has been much smaller – 
though no less statistically significant – in the east. By 2011, coverage of the 
bargaining-free sector in eastern Germany had risen to 76.3 percent, as compared with 
61.8 percent in western Germany. On the other hand, both the incidence and pattern of 
decline in the share of plants with works councils is very similar in the two broad 
regions and the trends well determined in each. It is also fair to say that much the same 
patterns by broad region are evident in the coverage of collective bargaining and worker 
representation by employee data (compare west and east in columns II of Appendix 
Table A1).  
It is of course possible to present a finer breakdown of coverage by individual 
federated state (Bundesland). For example, Ellguth and Kohaut (2013: 284) examine the 
coverage of sectoral agreements by employment in 2012 for 15 of the 16 German states 
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(Länder) – Schleswig-Holstein being combined on this occasion with Hamburg. Their 
data indicate that the share of employees covered by sectoral agreements in west 
German states ranged from 51 to 58 percent with the exception of one outlier 
(Schleswig Holstein-Hamburg at 45 percent). In eastern Germany, no state has as high a 
share and the actual range is smaller: from 33 percent in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern to 
39 percent in Brandenburg. The same pattern in reverse is found for the uncovered 
sector; now the range is from 36 to 45 percent in the west and from 48 to 55 percent in 
the east. 
Next, as far as the joint presence of works councils and sectoral collective 
bargaining is concerned, there is further evidence of erosion. These results are 
summarized in Table 4. At the start of our period, 7.8 percent (35.4 percent) of 
establishments (employees) were covered by sectoral agreements and works councils 
whereas eleven years later only 5.8 percent (28.0 percent) of establishments 
(employees) were in that position. Each trend was statistically significant, pointing more 
directly to an attenuation of the dual system.
10 
Interestingly, the distribution of works 
councils by sectoral agreement is largely unchanged between 2000 and 2011. At the 
start of our sample period, 16.4 percent of plants following sectoral agreements had 
works councils. In 2011, the proportion was 17.6 percent. The corresponding 
employment shares were also very close at 59.8 percent and 58.6 percent, respectively. 
Clearly, the decline in the dual system is driven by the fact that sectoral agreements are 
losing momentum, not by a particularly strong decrease in the presence of works 
councils. Interestingly, works council presence in the burgeoning collective bargaining 
free sector, albeit sparse to begin with, displays only a modest decline over the sample 
period. Specifically, the share of plants with works councils but no collective 
agreements in the firmament of plants without collective bargaining fell from 4.9 
percent to 3.3 percent of all such establishments and from 19.0 percent to 18.3 percent 
of employment in all such establishments. That said, the share of 
establishments/employees without either a collective agreement or works councils in the 
entire sample covered rose substantially.
11
 
(Table 4 near here) 
Finally, although opening clauses and pacts are peripheral themes of this 
empirical inquiry, it is interesting to address the links between works councils and these 
contractual innovations, not least because many observers see works council presence as 
central to the issue of whether internal erosion is organized or destabilizing. However, 
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data limitations loom large here. That is, the relevant data on pacts pertain to 2006, 
2008, and 2009, while for opening clauses the available years are 2005, 2007, and 2011. 
In short, in any such inquiry, we are constrained to use just three layers of cross-section 
data, with no possibility of providing series for 2000-2011 as in the case of other 
variables considered here. Subject to this important lacuna, we provide weighted 
statistics at both establishment and employee level on coverage by type of innovation 
and workplace representation in Table 5.  
(Table 5 near here) 
Beginning with pacts for employment and competitiveness in panel (a) of the 
table, we observe firstly a modest increase in their extent over the 2006-2009 interval, 
namely from 13.7 to 15.0 percent in terms of employee coverage and from 2.3 to 2.6 
percent in terms of establishment coverage. More interesting perhaps is the finding that 
although the presence of works councils in establishments without pacts appears very 
stable, in the case of establishments with pacts reductions in works council coverage of 
4.6 percentage points for employment and 11.4 percentage points in establishment 
coverage are recorded over the period. As a practical matter, however, the importance of 
works councils in regimes with pacts is manifest, especially in large establishments.  
Turning to the presence of opening clauses in collective agreements, shown in 
panel (b) of the table, there is evidence of an overall increase in coverage of between 10 
and 13 percentage points over the period in question (2005-2011). As expected, the 
incidence of works councils is higher in establishments covered by agreements with 
opening clauses than in plants without them, and by a wide margin, but in both cases the 
tendency is to observe proportionally fewer works councils in 2011 than 2005. Panel (c) 
of the table documents the application of opening clauses (as opposed to their 
existence), and usage can be seen to have grown through time. However, among the 
firmament of plants using opening clauses those with works councils have shrunk in 
terms of their employment and establishment coverage, most obviously along the 
former dimension. 
The bottom line of this necessarily preliminary inquiry is that although contract 
innovations and works councils are intimately related, works council presence is 
diminishing here as well. There is little indication that the pronounced increase in the 
use of opening clauses has stimulated works councils since their relative incidence is 
little affected by activation or nonactivation. And as far as pacts are concerned, although 
works councils are even more dominant, as indexed by their majority employment and 
20 
 
establishment coverage, their incidence has unambiguously declined both in employee 
and employer shares. Alternatively put, the incidence of plants without a works council 
has grown in the cases of opening clauses and pacts. If innovations are flourishing, the 
fact remains that works council presence is diminishing. Their decline is admittedly 
modest but presumably any revitalization of the dual system would imply a growth in 
contractual innovation and a growth in works council presence. Yet we do not observe 
this in the data. 
Permanents Stayers, Newly-Founded and Failing Establishments. Figures 2 through 
4 examine the same body of evidence considered earlier but this time for different types 
of firms. This material is complemented by information in tabular form in Appendix 
Tables A2 through A4. Beginning with those plants that were present in each wave of 
the sample period – namely, permanent stayers – the coverage by establishment data 
summarized in panel (a) of Figure 2 resembles that reported earlier for the full sample. 
(This is not simply true for the all-German case but also for eastern and western 
Germany as well.) Thus, for Germany as a whole, sectoral bargaining coverage by 
establishment declined from 48.2 percent in 2000 to 40.2 percent in 2011, and the share 
of establishments without collective bargaining of any sort rose from 46.8 percent to 
57.1 percent, somewhat less marked than is the case for the cross-section data. Works 
council coverage actually increased. In all of these cases, the annual trend was 
statistically significant. On the other hand, we observe a broadly similar stability in 
firm-level collective bargaining coverage (i.e. no trend at the 0.05 level or better). There 
are no major differences at broad regional level, other than a lack of discernible trends 
for sectoral bargaining and works councils in eastern Germany. Although some 
differences emerge from panel (b) of Figure 2, where we consider coverage by 
employment, the same results still stand. Firm-level agreements are somewhat more 
important in the east than before, while the trend increase is statistically significant in 
the west. 
(Figures 2 and 3 near here) 
Figure 3 turns to newly-founded establishments and again presents coverage 
data for Germany as a whole. It is clear that sectoral (if not firm-level) bargaining is less 
pervasive among newly-founded establishments and remains so. Thus, the 
establishment (employment) coverage of sectoral agreements stood at 33.8 (39.0) 
percent in 2000 and was 29.2 (39.4) percent in 2010. The corresponding values for the 
collective bargaining free sector also displayed only modest change – from 64.0 (55.5) 
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percent and 68.2 (53.9) percent. For its part, firm-level bargaining recorded slight 
increases for both coverage measures. Interestingly, works council employment 
coverage receded, from 34.0 percent in 2000 to 27.5 percent in 2010. But none of these 
trends was statistically significant (at the 0.05 level or better) other than for the 
bargaining free zone (the establishment coverage measure alone) and works councils 
(employment coverage). That said, there were some differences between the two halves 
of Germany in annual trends and their signs. The major difference, however, is again 
the much lower coverage of sectoral bargaining in eastern Germany (see Appendix 
Table A3).  
(Figure 4 near here) 
Finally, Figure 4 summarizes the situation for firm deaths. In particular, the 
trends observed in respect of failing establishments more closely match those of the full 
sample. Thus, their sectoral agreement coverage by establishment (employment) fell 
from 48.6 percent (55.1 percent) in 2000 to 31.9 percent (42.2 percent) in 2009. The 
corresponding increases for failing plants without any collective bargaining were from 
48.2 percent (36.6 percent) in 2000 to 65.3 percent (51.6 percent) in 2009. (In all four 
cases the trend is statistically significant.) In line with the full sample, works council 
coverage among failing plants also trended down significantly on both measures. On the 
other hand, the negative time trends in respect of local bargaining developments among 
failing firms are not statistically significant. 
In sum, there are more similarities than dissimilarities among the different 
samples examined here in terms of the course of bargaining and worker representation 
over time in continuing and failing establishments. But if absence of coverage by any 
type of collective agreement is persistently higher among newly-founded establishments 
(always above 60 percent over the period in terms of establishment coverage) than in 
their failing counterparts observe also that this self-same regime tends to be dominant 
(and increasingly so) among the failing establishments, both in terms of establishment 
and employment coverage. It seems therefore safe to conclude that the observed decline 
in sectoral bargaining in the German private sector is mostly due to transitions from 
sectoral agreements to no agreements among existing establishments (see below).
12
 In 
turn, the evidence that closings are mostly from the no agreement sector suggests quite 
strongly that collective bargaining is itself not a cause of failure.      
Transitions Data 
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We next consider establishment transitions in respect collective bargaining institutions 
and the works council entity. Whereas we earlier traced institutional status in successive 
cross-sections, we now consider individual changes in status using overlapping cross 
sections.   
Annual Transitions, All Establishments. Annual transitions are given in Table 6 for 
eleven overlapping cross sections. We consider ‘introductions’, ‘abolitions’, and 
maintenance of the status quo ante (namely situations in which the particular institution 
had either ‘always existed’ or ‘never existed’). Beginning with sectoral bargaining, we 
see that by the end of 2001 no less that 90.3 percent of all establishments in Germany 
maintained their initial status, that is, in 44.5 (45.8) percent of the cases the sectoral 
agreement was always (never) present. By the end of the sample period, roughly the 
same share of plants recorded no change in status (i.e. 94.8 percent). Alternatively put, 5 
to 10 percent of all establishments change their sectoral collective bargaining status over 
the course of a year, a not inconsiderable amount of churning. Note also that while 44.5 
percent of the entire cross section was covered by a sectoral agreement in 2000 and 
2001, by the end of the sample period just 31.6 percent of all firms observed in 2010 
and 2011 had sectoral bargaining in both years, confirming the evidence presented 
earlier. The fall in sectoral agreements is continuous except for 2002-2003 and 2009-
2010. A reverse pattern obtains in respect of those plants never covered by a sectoral 
agreement: these climbed from 45.8 percent of the total in the first column to 63.2 
percent in the last column of the table.  
(Table 6 near here) 
Firm-level agreements seemingly have a tenuous hold, with around 97 percent 
of establishments never being covered by this regime in the overlapping cross sections. 
Correspondingly, changes in firm-level collective bargaining appear tiny. But recall that 
all values in the table are expressed as proportions of all establishments, so that there is 
in fact evidence of not inconsiderable fluidity. For their part, works councils are present 
in roughly 9 percent of all establishments. Since their measured net changes in status 
resemble those for firm-level agreements, it follows that transitions are of lower 
frequency for works councils.  
Regional differences are most marked in the case of sectoral collective 
bargaining. The share of ‘never existing’ agreements is much higher in eastern Germany 
by more than a 20 percentage point margin. Also note that the introduction of firm-level 
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agreements is always higher (with one exception) in the east. But regional differences in 
transitions in the case of works councils are altogether more muted.
13 
(Table 7 near here) 
Eleven-Year Transitions, Permanent Stayers. We also calculated transitions over the 
full sample period for permanent stayers. The main results of this exercise are presented 
in Table 7 and are as follows. First, almost one establishment in four either leaves or 
joins a sectoral agreement, the former route predominating by about three to one. 
Second, changes in works council status are a modest 4.6 percent of all transitions. 
Third, even if firm-level bargaining is sparse, transitions are extensive; in particular, 
over 80 percent of firm agreements will be terminated. Finally, western Germany 
records greater proportionate transitions in sectoral bargaining than does eastern 
Germany.  
 
A Note on the Role of Outsourcing 
As a final exercise, we address the possibility of collective bargaining coverage being 
connected to changes in outsourcing intensity. To this end we use a specific IAB survey 
question inquiring of the manager respondent whether the establishment increased its 
purchases of products/services from outside sources over the course of the preceding 
two years. This variable is coded as a 1/0 dummy variable and is available in the 2000, 
2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010 surveys. Given that we do not observe collective bargaining 
status in either 1998 or 1999 (it will be recalled that our observation window starts in 
2000), we discard the outsourcing information from the 2000 and 2001 surveys and 
focus exclusively on the remaining three rounds. Also note that since establishments are 
required to report the change in outsourcing over the last two years, our sample is 
necessarily made up of all establishments in which we have information in both t and t-
2, with t = 2004, 2007, and 2010. We therefore have three separate panel samples, 
namely, 2002-2004, 2005-2007, and 2008-2010, each containing around six hundred 
thousand establishments (weighted data). 
To avoid multiplication of the number of cases, and to keep the exercise as 
simple as possible, we (a) conflate the two active collective bargaining regimes into a 
single category (i.e. any type of collective agreement), and (b) consider two different 
subsamples made up of collective bargaining leavers and collective bargaining always 
members on the one hand, and collective bargaining joiners and collective bargaining 
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never members on the other. The main aim of this simple difference-in-differences 
exercise is to attempt a first-pass procedure allowing us to infer something about the 
relationship between changes in collective bargaining status and changes in outsourcing, 
the presumption being that, in principle, leavers (joiners) will tend to have a higher 
(lower) probability of increasing outsourcing than always members (never members). 
(Table 8 near here) 
The results of this exercise are given in Table 8. There is some suggestion that 
outsourcing is more likely to be observed among those establishment that exit collective 
bargaining than among those that have remain ‘covered’ by any type of collective 
agreement. That said, there is no indication that joiners decrease their outsourcing 
activities to a greater degree than the comparison group of always members. In any 
event, observe that in two out of three cases, leavers do have a higher probability of 
increasing outsourcing than do joiners. But there is scant evidence in these data that 
outsourcing can be seen as the culprit for the pronounced decline in collective 
bargaining coverage. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
We have sought to provide comprehensive information on the architecture of the 
German system of industrial relations in an essentially descriptive framework because 
we have argued that the extant information on changes in that system is fragmented. 
Providing consistent nationally representative data on the institutions of collective 
bargaining addresses the external erosion of the system by charting the decline in 
sectoral bargaining and the corresponding growth in the bargaining-free (or individual 
bargaining) zone. Widening the inquiry to consider somewhat neglected corresponding 
changes in the joint presence of works councils and sectoral bargaining coverage also 
addresses however bluntly the issue of the internal erosion of collective bargaining as 
well. 
Our principal finding is that the decline in sectoral collective bargaining, first 
observed in the 1980s and 1990s, is ongoing. It is apparent for establishments that 
survive throughout the period and for those that die. Thus, the observed decline in 
collective bargaining is not driven by the composition of the sample. Failing plants are 
no more likely to be covered by a sectoral agreement at the point of failure than the 
generality of establishments – closing establishments are mostly from the no agreement 
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sector. Uniquely, traditional bargaining coverage in new establishments evinces no 
trend over time but its level lies below that of continuing and failing establishments.  
There are also marked regional differences in levels of coverage. The coverage 
of sectoral bargaining is much greater in western than in eastern Germany, and 
developments in the former region have necessarily dominated national trends even if 
declines have been roughly proportional in the two halves of Germany. That said, east 
German developments may have proved a catalyst in promoting greater decentralization 
in sectoral bargaining elsewhere in the system – a point echoed in Silvia’s (2013: 225) 
depiction of reunification as providing an incubator for collective bargaining 
innovations. 
There are also differences in the decline in traditional bargaining by 
establishment size and by sector. Large establishments (>250 employees) have broadly 
double the coverage of sectoral bargaining than their counterparts with fewer 
employees. But declines again characterise both types, albeit at roughly half the rate in 
large plants as in small plants. As for manufacturing vs. services, again the predominant 
trend is downward. That said, certain sectors exhibit near stability of coverage and yet 
others only modest decline (e.g. construction and banking, respectively). Interestingly, 
those sectors with high bargaining coverage in western Germany – in ascending order, 
construction, energy/water/waste/mining, financial services, and public services/social 
insurance – also evince high coverage in eastern Germany. Collective bargaining 
coverage by employment in these four sectors as of 2011 was 67 (50) percent, 71 (48) 
percent, 79 (51) percent, and 87 (83) percent, respectively – where the figures in 
parenthesis are for eastern Germany (see Ellguth and Kohaut, 2012: 298).  
We also detect some erosion in works council coverage, most obviously in terms 
of the share of establishments covered measure. Declining works council coverage was 
first noted by Hassel (1999), and it appears to be ongoing despite recent legislation – the 
2001 Works Constitution Act – that sought to facilitate their formation (see Addison et 
al., 2004). More important still from the perspective of the distinctiveness and 
exclusivity of the German model is the declining share of establishments (and workers) 
having sectoral bargaining and works councils. Also of interest is the relatively high 
share of employees in establishments with sectoral agreements that are without works 
councils, amounting to two-fifths of employees. In short, the dual system still appears to 
be in retreat more than a decade after the deliberations of the Kommission 
26 
 
Mitbestimmung (1998). But there is little to suggest that works council decline has 
exacerbated internal erosion. 
We found no real evidence of any material increase in the extent of firm-level 
collective bargaining. Arguably, this source of decentralization has lost steam, most 
obviously in western Germany. One possibility is that contractual innovations – in 
particular, opening clauses and pacts for employment and competitiveness – have made 
firm-level agreements (if not collective bargaining free regimes) less attractive on 
transaction cost grounds. One form of flexibility may thus have been replaced by 
another. But this conjecture requires formal evaluation.  
Identification of the causes of the erosion of traditional bargaining has proven 
elusive although there is no shortage of informal explanations. These include 
globalization (uniform wages across a sector become less relevant with an increase in 
international product market competition), new and more differentiated forms of 
organizing work that require possibilities to vary remuneration at the level of the 
production unit, and structural changes (see Ochel, 2005: 99). We examined one such 
candidate – outsourcing – but found little support for the notion that increases in 
outsourcing have had implications for the shrinkage in area-wide bargaining, although 
more work is clearly required here. 
If still in decline, what factors might be expected to curb the erosion of the dual 
system? The consensus seems to be that whatever the prospects for a strengthening in 
union organizational power (e.g. through increased organization of the service sector 
and newly emerging industries, and organizational reform such as ‘Projekt IG Metall, 
2009’) any such development is unlikely to be sufficient in and of itself. Our own 
limited investigation has revealed scant evidence of revitalization from below.  German 
writers thus tend to speak instead of a process of institutional stabilization through the 
polity (e.g. Bispinck and Schulten, 2009; Bispinck, Dribbusch, and Schulten, 2010). 
This re-stabilization from above implies the enhanced use of extension provisions or 
their equivalents. Arguably, the first stage in this battle seems to have been won with 
the agreement of the new coalition government on a national minimum wage. (Industry-
specific minimum wages for certain groups of workers were introduced in Germany 
under the 1996 Posted Workers Act/Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz. Although initially 
restricted to the construction industry and kindred trades (e.g. roofing and electrical 
trades), some 12 sectors are now covered. They include waste disposal, commercial 
cleaning, industrial laundries, security services, nursing care services, postal services, 
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and temporary help work agencies). Statutory minimum wages can set a wage floor that 
some sectors might build upon to reintroduce collective bargaining. That said, the more 
practical instrument of institutional stabilization would be more extensive extension 
provisions,
14 
which have been shown in countries such as the Netherlands to have 
stabilized the collective bargaining system (see, for example  Zachert, 2003, 2004; 
although for a more sceptical view, see Silvia, 2013, 226-228). 
Absent these supports, the German model may be expected to continue its 
transformation towards a competition-driven model of wage regulation (Hassel and 
Rehder, 2001) in which traditional wage bargaining institutions if not their functions are 
preserved albeit for a changed subset made up of larger German employers. In this 
event, appearances would be deceptive. 
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1. We comment on Hassel’s (2014) most recent diagnosis in the next section. 
2. However, a recent text by Silvia (2013) has done much to clarify the process of 
change behind which the German industrial relations system has ostensibly continued to 
perform much as intended. This English-language treatment goes behind the veil to 
provide a detailed picture of German industrial relations at the level of the actors on the 
one hand and the level of the law and the state on the other. Weaknesses are laid at the 
door of the social partners, since the law and the state have been supportive throughout. 
Membership losses of the union movement are attributed to “a shift in the labor milieu”, 
a societal movement away from collectivism toward individualization. The employer 
associations’ problems are allied to heightened market competition and emerging 
conflicts between their constituents. Their respective strategies for survival are also 
discussed in detail, against the backdrop of the continuing forces making for erosion. 
3. Under the agreement, working hours could differ for different groups of employees, 
working time accounts could be set up that permitted companies to deviate temporarily 
from the weekly agreed norm by compensating the worker with free time during a given 
period, and individual working time could vary within a certain corridor without 
triggering overtime bonuses. 
4. Pforzheim basically allowed derogations to improve competitiveness, safeguard 
employment, and facilitate new investment.  The agreement was in large part forced 
upon the unions by government (under Agenda 2010) which had threatened to change 
the legal framework of collective bargaining if there was no agreement between the 
parties on the “opening up” of what were seen as inflexible area-wide industry 
agreements (see Gerhard Schröder: Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Schröder 
vor dem Deutschen Bundestag (March 14, 2003), 
http://archiv.bundesregierung.de/bpaexport/regierungserklaerung/79/472179/multi.htm). 
5. Note that pacts are also used in establishments not covered by collective agreements. 
6. Hassel argues that this reliance on a services sector characterized by cost cutting has 
been made possible by privatization policies and labor market reforms specifically 
aimed at (deregulation of) the peripheral labor market.  
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7. Separate 20-year perspectives on the contributions of industrial relations specialists 
and labor economists to the study of unions and collective bargaining are offered by 
Müller-Jentsch (2013) and Jirjahn (2013), respectively. 
8. Deunionization and contractual innovation are in turn traced to the costs of German 
reunification and the opening up of nearby central and eastern European economies that 
offered a foretaste of the challenges of globalization.  
9. Thus, taking contractual innovations as a case in point, of the 137 empirical inquiries 
identified in Jirhahn’s (2013) wide-ranging overview, just 11 studies cover such 
practices. 
10. Statistically significant trend increases were recorded in the sector with neither 
collective bargaining nor works councils, where coverage by establishment 
(employment) rose from 46.6 percent (27.2 percent) in 2000 to 62.5 percent (36.8 
percent) in 2011. 
11. One possible qualification to these findings on worker representation has to do with 
forms of employee involvement other than in works councils. The evidence suggests 
that the share of establishments and employment in plants practising these other forms 
of involvement has risen at the same time as the corresponding shares of establishments 
with works councils has fallen (see Ellguth and Kohaut, 2011, p. 246; Ellguth and 
Kohaut, 2013, p. 286). At issue is whether employee involvement and analogous 
workplace practices are complementary or substitutes for works councils (see Addison, 
Schnabel, and Wagner, 2007; Ellguth, 2005). 
12. See Addison, Teixeira, Bryson, and Pahnke (2013) for a full discussion of whether 
the change in collective bargaining coverage is due to changes in establishment 
(observed) characteristics or to changes in establishment propensity to be covered by a 
collective agreement over approximately the same interval. The latter effect (or the 
within effect) is overwhelming dominant as an explanation for the observed decline in 
collective bargaining. 
13. The above patterns generally carry over to the population of permanent stayers 
(results for whom are available upon request).  Perhaps the most obvious contrast with 
the results in Table 5 is that the ‘always existing’ category is persistently higher for 
sectoral agreements among permanent stayers. This might be expected given that 
permanent stayers are on average of bigger size than the average establishment in the 
population. 
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14. The extension of collective agreements to all companies within a specific sector is 
provided for under section 5 of the Tarifvertragsgestetz. This legislation allows for an 
extension of collective agreements to all firms within a sector where the existing 
agreement covers one-half of the employees and where that extension is adjudged to be 
in the public interest. A majority of the tripartite collective bargaining committee in the 
Ministry of Labor has to approve the extension. As of 2009, just 1.5 percent of sectoral 
agreements were subject to extension. 
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Figure 1. Collective bargaining and works council coverage for Germany, 2000-2011 
(establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section weighted data) 
 
(a) Coverage by establishment 
 
 
(b) Coverage by employment 
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Figure 2. Collective bargaining and works council coverage for Germany, permanent 
stayers, 2000-2011 (establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section weighted 
data) 
 
(a)  Coverage by establishment 
 
 
 
(b) Coverage by employment 
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Figure 3. Collective bargaining and works council coverage in newly-founded 
establishments (i.e. births), Germany, 2000-2010 (establishments with at least 5 
employees, cross-section weighted data) 
 
(a) Coverage by establishment 
 
 
(b) Coverage by employment 
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Figure 4. Collective bargaining and works council coverage among closing 
establishments (i.e. deaths), Germany, 2000-2008 (establishments with at least 5 
employees, cross-section weighted data) 
 
(a) Coverage by establishment 
 
 
(b) Coverage by employment 
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Table 1. Collective bargaining and works council coverage for Germany, 2000-2011, 
by establishment size, weighted data, in percentage 
 Collective Agreement Status 
Sectoral 
Agreement 
Firm-Level 
Agreement No Agreement Works Council 
Year Size I II I II I II I II 
2000 Small 47.6 52.3 3.0 5.0 49.4 42.7 10.6 30.1 
 Large 71.7 76.6 12.0 12.8 16.4 10.6 87.6 92.4 
2001 Small 46.2 53.0 2.6 4.5 51.2 42.4 10.4 30.7 
 Large 72.2 75.2 13.1 14.6 14.7 10.2 88.6 92.0 
2002 Small 45.0 51.1 2.3 4.8 52.6 44.2 9.7 29.9 
 Large 74.0 77.8 11.1 12.1 15.0 10.1 89.7 93.7 
2003 Small 44.5 51.4 2.1 4.4 53.4 44.2 9.4 28.9 
 Large 71.5 74.7 12.0 13.9 16.5 11.5 88.1 92.2 
2004 Small 41.3 48.6 2.2 5.0 56.6 46.4 8.9 28.2 
 Large 70.9 76.8 12.9 12.4 16.2 10.9 88.6 92.7 
2005 Small 40.2 47.0 2.3 5.3 57.5 47.7 9.4 28.6 
 Large 70.3 76.3 12.9 12.6 16.7 11.1 87.7 91.5 
2006 Small 38.1 44.9 2.0 4.8 59.9 50.3 8.9 27.9 
 Large 67.1 73.3 13.1 14.0 19.8 12.7 83.5 89.2 
2007 Small 36.8 43.5 2.2 5.0 61.0 51.5 8.6 26.9 
 Large 66.6 73.6 12.7 12.1 20.7 14.3 84.4 89.3 
2008 Small 35.9 42.3 2.3 5.2 61.8 52.5 8.2 26.3 
 Large 63.8 70.0 12.3 13.3 24.0 16.8 83.3 88.9 
2009 Small 35.7 42.7 2.5 5.4 61.7 51.9 8.4 26.8 
 Large 61.3 67.1 13.5 15.6 25.2 17.4 84.0 89.5 
2010 Small 34.0 41.7 2.3 4.9 63.7 53.3 8.8 26.9 
 Large 64.5 69.9 13.2 14.2 22.3 15.8 83.8 88.9 
2011 Small 32.6 39.9 2.3 5.1 65.0 55.0 8.4 25.7 
 Large 64.5 70.1 11.8 13.0 23.7 16.9 85.2 89.0 
 
 
Trend 
         
Small -*** -*** n.s. +* +*** +*** -*** -*** 
Large -*** -*** n.s. n.s. +*** +*** -*** -*** 
Notes: I denotes the proportion of establishments and II the proportion of employees.  
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 2. Collective bargaining and works council coverage for Germany, 2000-2011, 
by sector, weighted data, in percentage 
 Collective Agreement Status 
Sectoral 
Agreement 
Firm-Level 
Agreement No Agreement Works Council 
Year Sector I II I II I II I II 
2000 Mfg & Constr. 56.3 66.1 3.7 6.4 40.0 27.5 12.1 56.5 
 Services 44.1 54.3 2.8 7.8 53.1 37.9 11.1 41.4 
2001 Mfg & Constr. 56.2 66.2 2.1 7.4 41.7 26.5 13.2 59.1 
 Services 42.3 55.1 2.9 7.6 54.7 37.3 10.4 41.7 
2002 Mfg & Constr. 56.3 68.0 1.8 6.0 41.9 26.0 11.9 60.0 
 Services 40.8 52.8 2.7 7.5 56.5 39.7 10.0 40.9 
2003 Mfg & Constr. 55.4 66.8 1.9 6.3 42.8 26.9 11.6 60.0 
 Services 40.7 52.6 2.3 7.7 57.0 39.7 9.7 39.1 
2004 Mfg & Constr. 53.1 64.9 2.2 6.1 44.7 29.0 10.4 58.7 
 Services 37.2 51.7 2.3 7.8 60.5 40.5 9.6 39.4 
2005 Mfg & Constr. 52.3 62.4 2.1 7.5 45.6 30.1 11.4 59.3 
 Services 36.0 50.7 2.6 7.3 61.4 42.0 9.8 38.1 
2006 Mfg & Constr. 51.2 60.8 2.0 8.2 46.8 30.9 10.7 57.9 
 Services 33.5 48.0 2.2 6.8 64.3 45.2 9.2 37.1 
2007 Mfg & Constr. 48.9 60.0 2.1 7.8 49.0 32.2 10.6 58.7 
 Services 32.7 47.2 2.4 6.6 65.0 46.2 9.0 36.1 
2008 Mfg & Constr. 48.8 58.6 2.1 8.5 49.1 32.9 9.6 58.7 
 Services 31.7 45.2 2.5 6.9 65.8 47.9 8.9 35.4 
2009 Mfg & Constr. 50.9 58.6 2.7 8.0 46.4 33.4 10.6 56.4 
 Services 29.9 44.0 2.6 8.5 67.5 47.5 8.6 37.2 
2010 Mfg & Constr. 45.8 56.6 2.5 8.9 51.6 34.5 10.8 56.4 
 Services 29.6 45.3 2.4 6.6 67.9 48.1 9.1 36.5 
2011 Mfg & Constr. 44.2 55.0 2.5 8.2 53.3 36.8 10.2 54.8 
 Services 28.3 43.4 2.4 6.5 69.3 50.1 8.8 34.5 
          
 
Trend 
Mfg & Constr. -*** -*** n.s. +*** +*** +*** -*** -** 
Services -*** -*** -* n.s. +*** +*** -*** -*** 
Notes: I denotes the proportion of establishments and II the proportion of employees. In 
this two-sector aggregation, construction is included in manufacturing. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 3A. Collective bargaining and works council coverage for Germany, 2000-2008, 
by sector, weighted data, in percentage 
 Collective Agreement Status 
Sectoral 
Agreement 
Firm-Level 
Agreement No Agreement 
 
Works Council 
Year Sector I II I II I II I II 
2000  
 
 
 
 
Manufacturing 
45.9 63.9 4.1 7.0 49.9 29.1 16.8 65.4 
2001 47.5 64.3 2.6 8.3 49.8 27.4 18.1 67.8 
2002 46.5 66.2 2.3 6.9 51.2 26.9 16.1 70.1 
2003 48.9 65.1 2.6 7.3 48.5 27.6 15.9 68.3 
2004 44.5 63.5 3.2 6.8 52.3 29.6 14.8 66.9 
2005 41.1 60.0 2.9 8.5 56.0 31.5 15.9 67.3 
2006 40.1 58.1 3.0 9.6 56.9 32.3 15.9 67.0 
2007 35.8 57.1 2.9 9.1 61.3 33.9 15.7 67.3 
2008 36.3 55.7 3.2 9.8 60.5 34.6 14.9 67.7 
Trend -*** -*** n.s. +** +*** +*** -** n.s. 
2000  
 
 
 
 
Construction 
68.8 73.6 3.2 4.2 28.1 22.3 6.3 27.5 
2001 67.0 72.8 1.4 4.0 31.7 23.2 7.0 28.6 
2002 70.1 75.6 1.1 2.3 28.8 22.1 6.0 24.6 
2003 64.4 73.8 0.9 2.3 34.7 24.0 5.7 24.2 
2004 64.7 70.9 0.9 2.9 34.4 26.2 4.5 22.2 
2005 68.2 73.6 0.9 3.0 31.0 23.4 4.9 22.4 
2006 65.5 72.8 0.7 2.1 33.8 25.0 4.0 18.4 
2007 67.7 73.8 0.9 1.8 31.4 24.4 3.4 18.4 
2008 65.6 72.1 0.7 2.6 33.6 25.2 2.4 16.9 
Trend n.s. n.s. -** -** n.s. +** -*** -*** 
2000  
 
 
 
 
Trade and 
Repair 
56.2 63.5 2.7 4.9 41.1 31.6 10.5 34.6 
2001 57.8 66.9 1.9 4.1 40.4 29.0 10.8 36.8 
2002 56.0 65.5 1.7 4.3 42.3 30.2 10.9 36.2 
2003 55.3 64.5 2.1 5.2 42.5 30.3 10.2 35.0 
2004 49.6 60.5 2.0 5.6 48.4 33.9 11.0 36.3 
2005 44.4 56.5 2.3 5.3 53.3 38.2 10.6 34.2 
2006 41.5 52.0 2.6 5.0 55.9 43.0 9.0 32.3 
2007 40.9 50.0 2.4 5.5 56.7 44.5 8.8 32.4 
2008 38.6 45.5 2.9 4.6 58.6 49.9 9.7 32.0 
Trend -*** -*** n.s. n.s. +*** +*** -** -** 
2000  
 
 
 
 
Traffic and 
Communications 
45.5 54.2 5.8 21.0 48.6 24.7 15.4 55.6 
2001 42.6 51.8 9.4 23.4 47.9 24.9 19.7 57.8 
2002 38.4 47.6 9.4 22.3 52.1 30.1 19.6 57.6 
2003 43.7 50.7 5.7 22.3 50.7 27.0 21.7 58.1 
2004 35.3 48.0 7.2 21.1 57.5 31.0 17.6 53.2 
2005 35.3 46.7 7.0 19.9 57.8 33.3 17.5 52.1 
2006 32.1 41.1 4.0 16.4 63.9 42.5 19.3 48.8 
2007 32.6 40.8 3.0 11.8 64.3 47.4 15.9 43.7 
2008 31.0 42.2 3.1 14.4 66.0 43.5 14.8 48.1 
Trend -*** -*** -** -*** +*** +*** n.s. -*** 
2000  
 
 
 
 
Banking and 
72.7 89.7 2.2 5.3 25.1 5.0 57.3 85.4 
2001 68.4 89.5 0.8 4.7 30.8 5.9 46.8 84.8 
2002 71.7 89.6 0.9 4.1 27.4 6.2 55.1 89.3 
2003 71.2 86.7 3.1 6.0 25.7 7.3 42.4 83.6 
2004 69.9 88.1 0.6 3.6 29.5 8.2 41.6 83.4 
2005 74.1 91.0 1.0 2.0 25.0 7.0 48.0 84.7 
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2006 Insurance 67.4 90.5 1.3 2.0 31.2 7.4 48.1 83.6 
2007 69.0 90.3 5.4 3.5 25.6 6.3 51.4 86.7 
2008 65.2 86.9 1.7 3.1 33.1 9.9 40.7 82.2 
Trend n.s. n.s. n.s. -** n.s. +** n.s. n.s. 
2000  
 
 
 
 
Industrial 
Services 
15.0 35.7 2.2 6.6 82.8 57.7 10.4 38.9 
2001 12.4 32.9 2.2 6.7 85.4 60.3 7.7 34.3 
2002 11.4 29.6 1.6 5.1 87.0 65.4 6.1 32.7 
2003 13.6 29.6 1.4 4.7 85.0 65.7 6.1 29.3 
2004 14.2 32.4 1.4 7.5 84.4 60.1 7.2 32.1 
2005 12.6 35.7 1.6 6.2 85.7 58.1 7.2 30.7 
2006 14.1 34.7 1.6 7.0 84.3 58.3 7.7 31.4 
2007 14.6 38.3 1.7 6.2 83.7 55.6 7.7 29.0 
2008 14.1 36.6 1.8 6.8 84.0 56.7 7.4 27.9 
Trend n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. -*** 
2000  
 
 
 
 
Other Services 
46.4 47.4 2.7 6.8 50.9 45.7 6.3 28.8 
2001 42.3 50.3 3.3 5.7 54.4 43.9 5.4 30.5 
2002 41.4 47.2 3.1 7.7 55.4 45.1 4.8 28.4 
2003 39.8 48.9 2.2 6.5 58.0 44.6 5.0 29.0 
2004 37.9 47.0 2.4 5.8 59.7 47.1 4.4 27.3 
2005 40.8 47.0 2.5 6.1 56.7 46.9 5.4 28.9 
2006 36.6 46.0 1.7 6.2 61.7 47.9 4.7 29.5 
2007 33.0 42.9 2.4 7.0 64.6 50.2 4.3 29.7 
2008 34.1 44.3 2.5 7.1 63.4 48.5 4.7 29.9 
Trend -*** -** n.s. n.s. +*** +*** -** n.s. 
Notes: I denotes the proportion of establishments and II the proportion of employees.  
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 3B. Collective bargaining and works council coverage for Germany, 2009-2011, 
by sector, weighted data, in percentage 
 Collective Agreement Status 
Sectoral 
Agreement 
Firm-Level 
Agreement No Agreement 
 
Works Council 
Year Sector I II I II I II I II 
2009  
Manufacturing  
36.6 54.8 4.0 9.1 59.3 36.1 15.0 66.4 
2010 32.5 52.9 4.0 10.7 63.5 36.4 15.7 66.6 
2011 31.4 51.8 3.9 9.5 64.8 38.7 15.7 65.9 
2009  
Construction 
69.3 73.4 0.9 2.5 29.7 24.1 3.3 19.0 
2010 64.2 70.7 1.0 2.6 34.7 26.8 3.4 21.0 
2011 60.1 66.0 0.8 3.2 39.1 30.7 3.1 16.6 
2009  
Trade 
39.2 46.5 3.2 5.9 57.6 47.6 9.6 33.1 
2010 37.2 46.7 2.3 4.2 60.5 49.2 9.7 32.2 
2011 33.7 43.3 2.1 3.9 64.2 52.7 10.0 30.4 
2009  
Traffic and 
Warehousing 
27.9 38.7 3.4 17.9 68.6 43.4 15.3 51.6 
2010 25.5 36.6 5.8 14.1 68.7 49.3 11.6 43.7 
2011 23.8 41.7 4.6 12.9 71.6 45.4 11.8 48.7 
2009  
Information and 
Communications 
9.8 20.4 1.3 6.9 88.9 72.8 13.2 44.0 
2010 9.5 25.8 1.7 3.7 88.8 70.5 15.0 48.1 
2011 8.1 16.5 2.1 3.6 89.8 79.9 12.8 43.5 
2009  
Hotels and 
Gastronomy 
35.1 46.2 1.6 3.8 63.3 50.0 2.1 9.5 
2010 38.5 51.1 1.2 2.4 60.3 46.5 2.3 10.5 
2011 32.4 45.1 2.3 2.6 65.3 52.3 2.9 8.6 
2009  
Financial and 
Insurance Services 
70.8 89.3 1.3 2.2 27.9 8.5 46.0 84.4 
2010 63.0 84.9 1.9 2.1 35.2 13.0 38.2 81.0 
2011 56.3 82.6 1.1 1.9 42.7 15.5 34.5 78.3 
2009 Commercial, 
Scientific, and 
Professional 
Services 
16.4 42.0 2.1 8.4 81.5 49.6 6.4 27.8 
2010 17.5 46.7 1.7 6.5 80.7 46.9 7.2 30.9 
2011 
18.3 46.9 1.8 4.4 79.9 48.7 6.9 26.9 
2009  
Education 
8.1 10.5 18.0 23.8 73.9 65.7 10.8 25.7 
2010 4.8 10.6 12.1 17.4 83.1 72.0 13.6 34.8 
2011 9.0 6.1 11.7 28.3 79.4 65.6 14.8 35.7 
2009  
Health and Social 
Care 
29.2 39.3 2.0 12.0 68.8 48.6 4.8 42.3 
2010 27.5 40.6 2.7 10.6 69.8 48.8 6.1 40.1 
2011 26.8 38.5 3.1 12.8 70.1 48.8 5.3 41.0 
2009  
Other Services 
42.8 39.9 1.0 5.0 56.2 55.0 5.0 25.2 
2010 33.7 33.7 0.5 3.6 65.8 62.7 6.3 23.8 
2011 45.5 36.2 0.8 4.1 53.7 59.8 4.9 18.1 
Note: I denotes the proportion of establishments and II the proportion of employees. 
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Table 4. Collective agreement and works council coverage in 2000 and 2011, weighted 
data, in percentage 
 2000 2011 
Establishments Employees Establishments Employees 
Establishments/employees covered by 
works councils and sectoral collective 
bargaining in the entire sample 
[(scb&woco)]/total 
 
Establishments/employees covered by 
sectoral collective bargaining but 
without works councils in the entire 
sample 
[(scb&nowoco)]/total 
7.8 
 
 
 
 
40.0 
35.4 
 
 
 
 
23.8 
5.8 
 
 
 
 
27.1 
28.0 
 
 
 
 
19.8 
Establishments/employees covered by 
works councils and firm-level 
agreements in the entire sample 
[(fcb&woco)]/total 
 
Establishments/employees covered by 
firm-level agreements but without 
works councils in the entire sample 
[(fcb&nowoco)]/total 
1.2 
 
 
 
 
1.9 
5.9 
 
 
 
 
1.4 
1.4 
 
 
 
 
1.1 
6.2 
 
 
 
 
1.0 
Establishments/employees covered by 
works councils and sectoral collective 
bargaining in the sectoral agreements 
sample 
[(scb&woco)]/total scb 
16.4 59.8 17.6 58.6 
Establishments/employees with works 
councils but without collective 
bargaining in the no collective 
agreement sample 
[(nocb&woco)]/total nocb 
4.9 19.0 3.3 18.3 
Establishments/employees without 
collective bargaining and without 
works councils in the entire sample  
[(nocb&nowoco)]/total 
46.6 27.2 62.5 36.8 
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Table 5. Company-level pacts, the existence and application of opening clauses, and 
works council presence, weighted data, in percentage 
 
(a) Company-level pacts (CLP) 
 
CLP 
(percentage in 
the total) 
Establishments and employees 
without CLP 
Establishments and employees 
with CLP 
Without works 
councils 
With works 
councils 
Without works 
councils 
With works 
councils 
2006 Employees  13.7 63.0 37.0 5.0 95.0 
Establishments 2.3 91.7 8.3 35.2 64.8 
2008 Employees  13.8 63.5 36.5 9.0 91.0 
Establishments 2.5 92.1 7.9 45.3 54.7 
2009 Employees  15.0 63.3 36.7 9.6 90.4 
Establishments 2.6 91.8 8.2 46.6 53.4 
 
(b) Opening clauses (in establishments bound by a collective agreement) 
 Opening 
clauses 
(percentage in 
the total) 
Establishments and employees 
without opening clauses 
Establishments and employees 
with opening clauses 
Without works 
councils 
With works 
councils 
Without works 
councils 
With works 
councils 
2005 Employees  39.7 41.5 58.5 18.7 81.3 
Establishments 20.9 81.6 18.4 69.4 30.6 
2007 Employees  43.6 46.7 53.3 18.6 81.4 
Establishments 21.2 85.1 14.9 67.0 33.0 
2011 Employees  52.7 50.3 49.7 23.6 76.4 
Establishments 31.2 82.1 17.9 72.6 27.4 
 
(c) Use of opening clauses (in establishments bound by a collective agreement 
containing opening clauses) 
 Use of opening 
clauses 
(percentage in 
the total) 
Establishments and employees 
with no use of opening clauses 
Establishments and employees 
with use of opening clauses 
Without works 
councils 
With works 
councils 
Without works 
councils 
With works 
councils 
2005 Employees  52.9 18.8 81.2 18.7 81.3 
Establishments 57.1 65.8 34.2 72.2 27.8 
2007 Employees  54.3 19.4 80.6 17.9 82.1 
Establishments 52.4 65.8 34.2 68.2 31.8 
2011 Employees  77.0 21.5 78.5 24.7 75.3 
Establishments 75.1 72.9 27.1 73.3 26.7 
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Table 6. Annual transitions in collective bargaining and works council status for Germany and by broad region, 2000-2011, all establishments, 
weighted data, in percentage 
  
  
From 2000 to 2001 From 2001 to 2002 From 2002 to 2003 From 2003 to 2004 From 2004 to 2005 From 2005 to 2006 
Germany West East Germany West East Germany West East Germany West East Germany West East Germany West East 
S
ec
to
ra
l 
A
g
re
em
en
t Always existing 44.5 49.8 24.6 43.7 49.4 23.4 44.1 49.0 22.3 40.9 45.6 21.4 38.3 42.2 8.2 37.8 41.3 22.5 
Introduced 5.0 5.2 4.0 2.4 2.7 1.2 3.1 3.2 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.6 2.6 4.2 1.8 1.9 1.6 
Abolished 4.7 4.9 3.9 4.1 4.2 3.7 3.9 4.2 2.6 4.2 4.8 1.5 3.7 4.2 6.7 3.5 3.7 2.4 
Never existing 45.8 40.1 67.5 49.9 43.7 71.7 48.9 43.6 72.6 52.5 47.3 74.4 55.3 51.0 81.0 56.9 53.1 73.5 
Net change 0.3 0.4 0.1 -1.7 -1.5 -2.4 -0.8 -0.9 0.0 -1.8 -2.5 1.2 -1.1 -1.6 -2.5 -1.7 -1.9 -0.8 
N 609,401 480,715 128,686 674,524 526,099 148,424 668,353 546,099 122,254 739,477 596,611 142,866 688,742 557,593 351,065 707,095 572,614 134,481 
F
ir
m
-L
ev
el
 A
g
re
em
en
t Always existing 1.9 1.5 3.6 1.9 1.5 3.5 1.5 1.0 3.3 1.4 1.1 3.0 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.1 2.8 
Introduced 0.8 0.6 1.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 1.2 
Abolished 1.4 1.2 2.0 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.9 
Never existing 95.9 96.7 93.0 96.8 97.2 95.3 97.1 97.6 95.0 97.7 98.2 95.5 97.2 97.7 97.6 97.4 98.0 95.2 
Net change -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.1 -0.3 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 
N 609,401 480,715 128,686 674,524 526,099 148,424 668,353 546,099 122,254 739,477 596,611 142,866 688,742 557,593 558,296 707,095 572,614 134,481 
W
o
rk
s 
C
o
u
n
ci
l 
Always existing 12.0 12.4 10.4 9.4 9.8 8.2 10.3 10.7 8.5 9.0 8.9 9.1 9.7 9.9 8.8 9.4 9.4 9.3 
Introduced 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.5 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Abolished 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.5 2.3 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.6 
Never existing 88.0 87.6 89.6 86.7 86.2 88.4 88.5 88.0 90.7 89.5 89.4 90.0 89.4 89.2 90.1 89.5 89.5 89.7 
Net change 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.1 
N 609,401 480,715 128,687 672,803 524,863 147,939 669,729 547,466 122,261 737,269 594,502 142,767 688,756 557,609 131,148 707,725 573,244 134,481 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  From 2006 to 2007 From 2007 to 2008 From 2008 to 2009 From 2009 to 2010 From 2010 to 2011 
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  Germany West East Germany West East Germany West East Germany West East Germany West East 
S
ec
to
ra
l 
A
g
re
em
en
t Always existing 35.7 39.4 20.1 34.4 37.7 21.3 34.2 37.9 19.5 34.3 38.3 19.0 31.6 35.1 17.7 
Introduced 1.9 2.0 1.6 2.8 3.0 1.6 3.1 3.6 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 2.0 2.1 1.8 
Abolished 3.5 3.9 1.7 3.0 3.2 2.5 3.4 3.5 3.2 2.4 2.5 2.0 3.2 3.5 1.8 
Never existing 58.9 54.7 76.6 59.9 56.1 74.6 59.3 55.0 76.3 62.2 58.0 77.9 63.2 59.3 78.7 
Net change -1.6 -1.9 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.9 -0.4 0.1 -2.2 -1.3 -1.3 -1.0 -1.1 -1.4 -0.1 
N 697,699 565,536 132,164 727,999 579,351 148,648 750,716 600,387 150,327 750,330 595,222 155,107 852,395 682,380 170,015 
F
ir
m
-L
ev
el
 A
g
re
em
en
t Always existing 1.6 1.1 3.6 1.7 1.2 3.4 1.7 1.8 2.9 2.3 1.9 3.9 1.8 1.5 3.0 
Introduced 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.8 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.8 
Abolished 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 
Never existing 97.4 98.0 94.7 97.4 97.8 95.5 96.9 96.9 95.0 97.3 97.7 95.7 96.9 97.3 95.5 
Net change 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
N 697,699 565,536 132,164 727,999 579,351 148,648 750,716 603,064 150,327 750,330 595,222 155,107 852,395 682,380 170,015 
W
o
rk
s 
C
o
u
n
ci
l 
Always existing 9.4 9.6 8.6 8.8 9.1 8.1 8.9 8.9 8.8 9.9 10.2 8.7 9.1 9.3 8.4 
Introduced 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Abolished 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Never existing 89.9 89.7 90.9 90.1 89.8 91.1 90.4 90.3 90.6 89.2 88.8 90.8 90.2 90.0 90.8 
Net change 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 -0.5 0.3 0.4 -0.1 0.4 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
N 697,700 565,535 132,164 728,262 579,614 148,648 751,178 600,868 150,309 750,346 595,238 155,108 853,611 683,094 170,517 
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Table 7. 11-year transitions in collective bargaining and works council status for 
Germany and by broad region, 2000-2011, permanent stayers, weighted data, in 
percentage  
 Germany  West  East 
 
 
 
Sectoral Agreement 
Always existing 30.1 35.3 14.3 
Introduced 6.2 7.0 3.6 
Abolished 18.1 20.5 10.8 
Never existing 45.6 37.3 71.3 
Net change -11.9 -13.5 -7.2 
Number of observations 125,301 94,510 30,792 
 
 
 
Firm-Level Agreement 
Always existing 0.8 0.3 2.4 
Introduced 1.0 0.9 1.4 
Abolished 4.2 4.4 3.4 
Never existing 94.0 94.3 92.8 
Net change -3.1 -3.5 -2.0 
Number of observations 125,301 94,510 30,792 
 
 
 
Works Council 
Always existing 7.5 6.9 9.4 
Introduced 2.0 2.5 0.7 
Abolished 2.6 1.8 4.9 
Never existing 87.9 88.8 85.1 
Net change -0.5 0.7 -4.2 
Number of observations 125,301 94,510 30,792 
 
 
 
Table 8. Collective bargaining regime and outsourcing, 2002-2004, 2005-2007, and 
2008-2010 
 
 
Conditional probability of increasing outsourcing given 
the initial collective bargaining state (in percentage) 
Initial collective 
bargaining state 
 
Sample  
t0: 2002 
t1: 2004 
(2002-2004 
panel) 
t0: 2005 
t1: 2007 
(2005-2007 
panel) 
t0: 2008 
t1: 2010 
(2008-2010 
panel) 
Not covered by 
any collective 
agreement at t0 
CB joiners 6 18 6 
CB never 
members 5 7 6 
Covered by 
some collective 
agreement at t0 
CB leavers 11 9 10 
CB always 
members 7 10 6 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Collective bargaining and works council coverage for Germany and by 
broad regions, 2000-2011, all establishments, weighted data, in percentage 
 
 
Collective Agreement Status 
Sectoral 
Agreement 
Firm-Level 
Agreement 
No Agreement Works Council 
Year Region I II I II I II I II 
2000 
Germany 47.9 59.1 3.1 7.2 49.0 33.7 11.4 47.6 
West 52.7 62.7 2.6 6.5 44.7 30.8 11.5 49.3 
East 28.1 41.2 5.1 10.8 66.8 48.0 11.0 39.2 
2001 
Germany 46.5 59.5 2.7 7.5 50.8 33.0 11.2 48.7 
West 51.2 63.5 2.2 6.3 46.6 30.1 11.4 50.4 
East 27.2 39.8 4.7 13.2 68.2 47.0 10.5 40.5 
2002 
Germany 45.3 58.9 2.4 6.9 52.2 34.2 10.6 48.6 
West 50.1 62.7 2.0 5.9 47.9 31.3 10.8 49.9 
East 24.5 39.2 4.3 11.9 71.2 48.9 9.5 41.7 
2003 
Germany 44.8 58.2 2.2 7.2 53.0 34.7 10.3 47.3 
West 49.9 61.9 1.8 6.5 48.2 31.6 10.5 48.7 
East 23.1 39.2 3.6 10.7 73.2 50.1 9.3 40.1 
2004 
Germany 41.6 56.7 2.3 7.1 56.1 36.1 9.8 46.8 
West 45.9 60.4 2.0 6.6 52.1 33.1 10.0 48.2 
East 23.5 38.1 3.5 10.1 73.0 51.8 9.2 39.7 
2005 
Germany 40.5 55.2 2.4 7.3 57.1 37.5 10.2 46.2 
West 44.3 58.5 2.0 6.8 53.7 34.7 10.6 47.7 
East 24.4 37.8 4.1 10.4 71.5 51.9 9.1 38.0 
2006 
Germany 38.4 52.9 2.1 7.4 59.5 39.8 9.7 45.1 
West 41.8 56.0 1.7 6.6 56.5 37.4 9.7 46.5 
East 23.5 36.4 4.1 11.3 72.4 52.3 9.3 37.6 
2007 
Germany 37.1 52.0 2.3 7.0 60.6 40.9 9.5 44.6 
West 40.6 55.1 1.8 6.3 57.6 38.5 9.6 46.2 
East 22.0 35.4 4.3 10.8 73.6 53.8 8.7 35.7 
2008 
Germany 36.2 50.1 2.4 7.5 61.4 42.4 9.1 44.0 
West 39.3 53.1 2.0 6.8 58.7 40.0 9.3 45.7 
East 23.4 34.8 3.9 10.9 72.7 54.4 8.0 35.5 
2009 
Germany 36.0 49.7 2.6 8.3 61.3 42.0 9.2 44.7 
West 39.6 52.8 2.3 7.7 58.1 39.5 9.3 46.4 
East 21.1 33.9 4.0 11.5 74.9 54.6 9.1 36.2 
2010 
Germany 34.3 49.6 2.5 7.5 63.2 42.9 9.6 44.1 
West 37.8 52.8 2.2 6.8 60.1 40.4 9.8 45.7 
East 19.9 32.9 3.6 11.2 76.5 55.9 8.7 36.0 
2011 
Germany 32.9 47.8 2.4 7.2 64.6 45.0 9.3 42.4 
West 36.1 51.0 2.1 6.4 61.8 42.6 9.4 44.0 
East 19.8 32.1 3.9 11.0 76.3 56.9 8.7 34.5 
Trend 
         
Germany -*** -*** n.s. n.s. +*** +*** -*** -*** 
West -*** -*** n.s. n.s. +*** +*** -*** -*** 
East -*** -*** n.s. n.s. +*** +*** -*** -*** 
  Notes: I denotes the proportion of establishments and II the proportion of employees.  
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  *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, 
respectively. 
Table A2. Collective bargaining and works council coverage for Germany and by 
broad regions, 2000-2011, permanent stayers, weighted data, in percentage 
 Collective Agreement Status 
Sectoral 
Agreement 
Firm-Level 
Agreement No Agreement Works Council 
Year Region I II I II I II I II 
2000 Germany 48.2 60.0 5.0 6.9 46.8 33.1 10.1 42.2 
 West 55.7 66.2 4.7 5.6 39.5 28.1 8.7 42.8 
 East 25.1 38.8 5.8 11.3 69.1 49.9 14.2 40.1 
2001 Germany 51.2 60.6 4.4 7.5 44.4 31.9 11.7 45.1 
 West 59.1 66.4 3.7 5.9 37.2 27.7 11.1 46.3 
 East 26.4 38.5 6.6 13.7 67.0 47.8 13.8 40.6 
2002 Germany 48.8 58.9 3.2 7.9 48.0 33.2 10.7 43.4 
 West 58.0 65.5 2.3 6.0 39.7 28.5 11.3 45.3 
 East 24.2 37.3 5.7 14.0 70.1 48.7 8.9 36.9 
2003 Germany 52.7 60.6 1.6 8.6 45.7 30.8 11.3 47.1 
 West 62.1 66.0 1.1 8.0 36.8 25.9 12.2 49.5 
 East 23.7 40.5 3.1 10.8 73.2 48.8 8.4 38.5 
2004 Germany 50.0 58.8 1.7 8.2 48.3 33.0 10.8 45.8 
 West 59.2 64.7 1.1 7.3 39.7 27.9 11.3 47.8 
 East 23.9 37.5 3.4 11.3 72.7 51.1 9.3 38.9 
2005 Germany 48.3 57.7 1.8 7.1 49.9 35.2 10.4 44.3 
 West 55.5 62.4 1.3 6.1 43.2 31.5 10.8 45.5 
 East 26.2 40.6 3.5 10.6 70.3 48.8 9.4 39.8 
2006 Germany 45.8 55.9 2.3 8.4 51.9 35.7 12.1 46.2 
 West 52.9 60.6 1.5 7.6 45.6 31.8 12.4 47.9 
 East 24.1 37.7 4.8 11.6 71.1 50.7 11.1 40.0 
2007 Germany 44.5 54.2 2.3 8.6 53.2 37.2 11.6 48.3 
 West 51.1 58.2 1.3 8.0 47.6 33.9 11.9 50.3 
 East 23.4 37.5 5.3 11.3 71.3 51.2 10.6 39.9 
2008 Germany 43.0 54.0 2.2 8.4 54.9 37.6 11.6 49.7 
 West 48.8 57.9 1.3 7.1 49.9 35.0 12.3 52.0 
 East 26.3 39.6 4.5 13.4 69.2 47.0 9.6 41.4 
2009 Germany 42.9 54.5 2.1 9.6 55.0 35.9 11.5 51.0 
 West 49.7 59.0 1.5 8.8 48.9 32.2 12.2 53.6 
 East 23.3 37.5 3.8 12.7 72.9 49.9 9.7 41.2 
2010 Germany 41.4 55.1 2.4 9.5 56.3 35.3 12.6 53.9 
 West 47.6 59.6 1.7 8.3 50.7 32.1 13.4 56.0 
 East 23.5 37.5 4.3 14.3 72.2 48.2 10.4 45.6 
2011 Germany 40.2 54.0 2.8 8.6 57.1 37.4 11.8 49.9 
 West 46.3 58.4 2.2 7.2 51.6 34.4 12.6 51.6 
 East 22.6 38.0 4.5 13.6 72.9 48.4 9.5 43.9 
 
 
Trend 
         
Germany -*** -*** -* +*** +*** +*** +** +*** 
West -*** -*** -* +** +*** +*** +*** +*** 
East n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. +* n.s. n.s. +*** 
Notes: I denotes the proportion of establishments and II the proportion of employees. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, 
respectively. 
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Table A3. Collective bargaining and works council coverage for Germany and by 
broad regions, 2000-2010, newly-founded establishments, weighted data, in 
percentage 
 
 Collective Agreement Status 
Sectoral 
Agreement 
Firm-Level 
Agreement No Agreement Works Council 
Year Region I II I II I II I II 
2000 Germany 33.8 39.0 2.2 5.5 64.0 55.5 7.1 34.0 
 West 38.9 40.9 2.1 6.1 59.0 53.0 5.9 35.3 
 East 16.5 32.3 2.7 3.2 80.7 64.5 11.0 29.2 
2001 Germany 30.3 41.7 2.4 8.1 67.4 50.2 7.7 32.6 
 West 33.7 45.5 2.6 8.1 63.7 46.4 6.9 33.9 
 East 15.3 22.2 1.5 8.2 83.2 69.6 11.2 25.8 
2002 Germany 32.3 47.3 2.7 5.0 65.1 47.7 8.5 35.3 
 West 35.3 51.5 2.5 4.2 62.3 44.2 8.6 36.4 
 East 16.3 25.2 3.6 9.2 80.1 65.6 7.9 29.3 
2003 Germany 32.5 43.8 3.9 6.3 63.6 49.9 10.0 35.6 
 West 36.7 48.7 4.3 5.8 59.1 45.5 10.2 37.7 
 East 15.9 22.0 2.2 8.5 81.8 69.5 9.1 26.3 
2004 Germany 28.0 40.9 2.9 8.1 69.1 51.0 7.3 35.0 
 West 30.8 44.3 2.9 8.2 66.3 47.5 7.0 36.3 
 East 17.3 27.2 3.2 7.4 79.6 65.4 8.4 29.7 
2005 Germany 32.1 43.1 2.4 7.5 65.5 49.4 7.4 31.5 
 West 35.2 46.6 1.9 6.9 62.9 46.5 7.5 33.0 
 East 19.3 28.2 4.1 10.2 76.5 61.7 6.7 24.8 
2006 Germany 31.9 41.4 2.2 6.4 65.8 52.1 6.7 30.4 
 West 34.8 44.5 1.7 5.6 63.5 49.9 6.8 31.7 
 East 20.2 28.5 4.2 10.0 75.6 61.5 6.3 24.7 
2007 Germany 30.3 40.4 2.5 5.9 67.3 53.7 5.8 27.5 
 West 32.6 42.6 2.3 4.8 65.1 52.5 5.8 28.6 
 East 20.6 30.6 3.1 10.3 76.3 59.1 6.0 23.1 
2008 Germany 30.1 41.0 2.6 6.1 67.3 53.0 6.6 28.4 
 West 32.0 43.2 2.4 5.2 65.6 51.6 6.7 29.5 
 East 22.8 31.7 3.4 9.7 73.9 58.6 6.3 23.7 
2009 Germany 30.1 39.3 2.6 7.9 67.3 52.8 6.4 28.4 
 West 32.2 41.5 2.3 7.2 65.5 51.3 6.3 29.2 
 East 21.4 30.3 3.8 10.9 74.7 58.8 7.1 25.0 
2010 Germany 29.2 39.4 2.6 6.8 68.2 53.9 7.1 27.5 
 West 31.5 41.9 2.3 5.8 66.1 52.3 7.2 27.9 
 East 19.7 28.9 3.5 10.7 76.8 60.3 7.0 26.0 
 
 
Trend 
         
Germany -* n.s. n.s. n.s. +* n.s. -* -*** 
West -** n.s. n.s. n.s. +** n.s. n.s. -*** 
East +*** n.s. +* +*** -*** -*** -*** -** 
Notes: I denotes the proportion of establishments and II the proportion of employees. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the .01, .05 and.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table A4. Collective bargaining and works council coverage for Germany and by 
broad regions, 2000-2009, closing establishments, weighted data, in percentage 
 Collective Agreement Status 
Sectoral 
Agreement 
Firm-Level 
Agreement 
No Agreement Works Council 
Year Region I II I II I II I II 
2000 Germany 48.6 55.1 3.1 8.3 48.2 36.6 11.5 41.7 
 West 54.0 59.3 2.6 8.0 43.3 32.7 12.1 44.3 
 East 28.7 37.8 5.0 9.7 66.3 52.5 9.3 31.2 
2001 Germany 46.3 56.3 2.3 6.8 51.5 36.9 11.0 40.3 
 West 50.9 60.6 1.8 6.1 47.3 33.3 11.3 42.0 
 East 28.6 37.9 3.9 9.9 67.5 52.2 9.6 32.9 
2002 Germany 45.6 55.6 1.7 5.4 52.7 39.0 9.2 38.3 
 West 50.0 60.0 1.3 4.7 48.7 35.3 9.4 39.8 
 East 24.9 33.2 3.4 9.1 71.7 57.7 8.1 30.8 
2003 Germany 45.3 56.3 2.6 5.9 52.2 37.8 10.0 38.0 
 West 50.4 60.7 2.4 5.4 47.2 33.9 10.6 39.7 
 East 22.4 34.8 3.2 8.1 74.3 57.2 7.5 29.8 
2004 Germany 40.8 50.8 2.3 7.2 56.8 42.1 9.6 36.6 
 West 44.8 53.5 2.4 7.4 52.9 39.1 10.2 37.8 
 East 22.5 37.5 2.1 6.0 75.4 56.4 6.9 31.1 
2005 Germany 38.5 47.8 2.7 7.7 58.8 44.4 9.9 36.0 
 West 41.6 50.3 2.5 7.4 55.9 42.2 10.3 37.1 
 East 22.8 34.8 3.8 9.4 73.4 55.8 7.9 30.0 
2006 Germany 35.2 43.8 2.6 7.1 62.3 49.1 9.1 33.3 
 West 37.1 45.3 2.5 6.7 60.4 48.0 9.4 34.3 
 East 25.6 36.1 3.0 9.0 71.4 54.8 7.4 28.2 
2007 Germany 33.3 42.3 2.2 7.4 64.5 50.3 8.8 33.3 
 West 36.4 44.4 2.0 7.0 61.7 48.5 9.3 34.8 
 East 18.9 30.5 3.3 9.4 77.8 60.0 6.7 25.6 
2008 Germany 30.6 42.0 2.1 6.1 67.3 51.9 7.9 30.2 
 West 32.8 44.2 1.9 5.0 65.2 50.8 8.2 31.0 
 East 20.4 31.5 2.8 11.3 76.8 57.2 6.3 26.2 
2009 Germany 31.9 42.2 2.8 6.1 65.3 51.6 7.3 28.6 
 West 35.1 46.0 2.6 4.4 62.3 49.6 7.5 29.0 
 East 17.9 25.4 3.7 13.8 78.5 60.7 6.3 27.1 
 
 
Trend 
         
Germany -*** -*** n.s. n.s. +*** +*** -*** -*** 
West -*** -*** n.s. n.s. +*** +*** -*** -*** 
East -*** -*** n.s. n.s. +*** +** -*** -*** 
Notes: I denotes the proportion of establishments and II the proportion of employees. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
